

**Uyghurs Without Borders? The Economic and Social Status of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan
and Its Impact on Interethnic Conflict and Transnational Threats**

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The one year anniversary of the July 2009 Urumqi Riots, the clash between Chinese and Uyghurs in the Xinjiang capital, came and went without any major incidents. Several demonstrations took place around the world where Uyghur expatriate groups live, including in Turkey and the United States,¹ but violence did not erupt in Xinjiang as had been anticipated, due in part to tight security measure put in place.² While attention was paid to Xinjiang, no notice was on the Uyghurs in Kazakhstan. This despite a large demonstration that took place at the Palace of the Republic in Almaty, Kazakhstan a year previously, where several thousand Uyghurs gathered to voice frustration over the July 2009 Riots.³ The protest was unique in its size and nature, as Uyghurs in Kazakhstan do not often come together in support of Xinjiang nor does the government in Kazakhstan freely give out permission to do so. It also brings to light an important and less considered point; that Uyghurs in Kazakhstan may demonstrate support for their kin across the border in Xinjiang, but do not support separatism or extremism there.

In the context of security concerns in Central Asia, particularly interethnic conflict and transnational threats, Uyghurs in Kazakhstan should be looked at for three reasons. First, they are the largest group of Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang and they inhabit areas of Kazakhstan that border the region, specifically where a large part of Kazakh-Chinese trade transits through. This economic link is becoming increasingly fundamental to both countries, and they will take appropriate measures to protect it. Secondly, significant attention on Uyghurs around the world is on their involvement in extremist activities and their lobbying actions for a homeland. This is not to say that this attention is misguided or that these things do not happen among certain

groups, but that it does not include all aspects of Uyghur interests, especially in Kazakhstan. This leads to the third reason; that Uyghurs in Kazakhstan have a high enough economic and social status that they are integrated to a point where their loyalty and view towards their kin in Xinjiang may not be in line with other Uyghur interest groups. If another incident like the July 2009 Riots occurs, this group's status can determine their level of support for violent elements in Xinjiang. Their status and integration levels can also be an indicator of how likely they are to be involved in interethnic clashes if a Kyrgyzstan type situation, where interethnic violence between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz occurred in June 2010, were to happen in Kazakhstan. Ultimately, this group of Uyghurs could be looked at as an integration model for ethnic minorities in Central Asia.

Background

Before examining Uyghurs' status and integration in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to give some historical background on this ethnic group, particularly how they came to be in Kazakhstan. Uyghurs are Turkic people, originating in the Eurasian Steppe region. Their history stretches back to 744, when they formed their own khanate in the Orkhon Valley, present day Mongolia.⁴ The history of Uyghurs is well documented after the formation of this khanate, but the focus of this article is what historical events have most influenced Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, which is in more recent history. These events start with the Russian Empire's expansion in the Central Asian region; eastward into Siberia during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, and south into Central Asia during the Great Game.⁵ This expansion happened in areas to the west and north of Xinjiang, the region that modern Uyghurs view as their homeland.

Russian interests in the Xinjiang region have been political and economic. Russia has traditionally created buffer zones around its territory in an effort to protect itself and to create economic opportunities. These regions became absorbed into the Russian Empire (and later Soviet Union), as was the case for the Central Asian states, or became focus points of Russian economic interest as in the case of Xinjiang. As early as the eighteenth century, Russia imported goods from areas in Xinjiang.⁶ During this time the border between the Russian Empire and the Chinese Qing Dynasty was open, which allowed Uyghurs to come over from Xinjiang and trade. From the mid-eighteenth century up to the 1950s, Russia conducted a large amount of trade with Xinjiang, as it had not yet been fully integrated into China proper.⁷ For several decades Uyghurs conducted cross-border trade, which meant that they often lived in the Russian Empire.⁸ However, certain political events solidified how Uyghurs came to Kazakhstan.

In 1864 Muslims in Xinjiang, as well as other regions across China, revolted against the Qing Dynasty. Russia helped suppress the revolt by moving into the Ili region of Xinjiang in 1871. Russia occupied this area until 1881 when it signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg with China. One of the terms of this treaty allowed Uyghurs from this region of Xinjiang to migrate to the Russian Empire (Kazakhstan). A large number of them left Xinjiang at this time and cross-border trade continued, although some Uyghurs fled the Soviet Union to Xinjiang during purges in the 1930s. Conversely, in the 1950s and 60s there were events in China that again caused Uyghurs to flee and settle in the Soviet Union.⁹ When Soviet-Chinese relations turned worse, cross-border trade stopped until after Kazakhstan's independence.

The break-up of the Soviet Union once more enabled cross-border trade. Ethnic Uyghurs on both sides of the border began trading and came into contact with each other after many years apart.¹⁰ This contact highlighted the differences among Uyghurs that had been present for a few

generations. The longer a Uyghur (and subsequent generations) have lived in Kazakhstan, the more integrated they have become. Uyghurs in Kazakhstan can be roughly divided into three groups: *yerliklär*, ‘the locals’ are those who have lived in Kazakhstan for several generations; *kegänlär*, ‘the newcomers’ are those who immigrated during the 1950s and 60s; and *khitailiklär* which means ‘from China or Chinese’ and refers to those who have come during the years following Kazakhstan’s independence. Conversely, the ‘Chinese’ Uyghurs call their kin in Kazakhstan *sovetliklär*, ‘Soviets’. They will refer to each other by these names at times in a critical sense, which have at times led to some friction among Uyghurs of different generational groups.¹¹ Just as interesting are the linguistic differences among these groups; Uyghurs that have lived in Kazakhstan for a generation or longer likely use Russian more often than their native language.¹²

How Do Uyghurs Fit In? The Economic and Social Status of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan

This is the largest group of Uyghurs outside Xinjiang and they are a significant minority of Kazakhstan’s population. According to census’ taken in the Kazakhstan, their numbers have increased over the last 30 years.¹³ Uyghurs live in the south-eastern parts of Kazakhstan, in various districts in the Almaty Oblast (including the aptly named Uyghur District), and in Almaty (the largest city in Kazakhstan).¹⁴

The significance of this area cannot be overemphasized; it shares the border with Xinjiang and it is the area where the majority of the trade between Kazakhstan and China transits. Since 1991, Kazakhstan’s economy has developed and become open to international investment at a level and pace unseen in comparison to its post-Soviet, Central Asian neighbors.¹⁵ Russia remains important for Kazakhstan’s economy since they have a long history

together and some shared infrastructure, particularly in the northern regions. However, over the last several years China has turned into a strong economic partner and a significant investor.



The Kazakh-Chinese economic relationship is an exchange of raw materials and goods; China receives natural resources such as oil, gas, and metals, while sending consumer goods to Kazakhstan.¹⁶ This happens in the context of Kazakh-Chinese joint ventures for the large-scale and industrial trade sector, and small businesses and even individual traders for the consumer goods sector. Both sectors of this economic relationship will continue to be important, as both sides need it to continue developing. Kazakhstan needs investments and buyers of its natural resources, while China needs these resources to fuel its own economy and a buyer of the large

amount of goods it produces. Currently, Kazakh-Chinese trade now makes up seventy percent of all Chinese-Central Asian trade.¹⁷

Kazakhstani Uyghurs' economic involvement can be a factor for judging how well integrated they are. For them, the buying and selling of consumer goods is one of their avenues of opportunity. Kazakh-Chinese relations developed following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the border became more open for trade. This allowed "shuttle-traders" to buy goods in China and return to Kazakhstan on short business trips.¹⁸ The shuttle routes take place on the Khorgos road, which runs right through the Uyghur District and is the most direct route for shuttle traders to buy and sell goods, or by rail through the Alatau Pass and then on to Almaty or other parts of Kazakhstan. Uyghurs were able to secure economic trade opportunities and flourish, especially during the period immediately following the opening of the border.¹⁹ Generally, Uyghurs are not involved in heavy industrial trade, almost all of which is controlled by Kazakh or Chinese state run enterprises.

The exact economic value of this shuttle trade is hard to determine, but a 2006 estimate puts the value of goods at \$1 billion. During the 1990s most of the trade was being conducted by Uyghurs on both sides of the border. In more recent years ethnic Hans from Xinjiang have taken over a large part of this trade on the Chinese side, under the supervision and auspices of the Xinjiang Provisional and Construction Corps (XPCC).²⁰ The XPCC took a significant hold over trade in the consumer goods sector in Xinjiang in the early 2000s, and continues to operate it. Some Uyghur traders remained in small numbers specifically in the Barakholka market in Almaty, Kazakhstan.²¹ In more recent years, however, even these Uyghurs have been marginalized by other business interests in Kazakhstan.²²

Despite being largely pushed out of the lucrative cross-border trade, Uyghurs are still finding ways to earn a living. The Republican Uyghur Association of Manufacturers, Entrepreneurs, and Agricultural Workers is an organization involved in just what its title states, economic activities that benefit those specifically in the regions where Uyghurs live.²³ This association is led by the same businessman (and a supporter of Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev) who helped to open the Republican Culture Center of Uyghurs.²⁴ It remains open as an opportunity for the local Uyghur community. Additionally, the Uyghur District is headed by an ethnic Uyghur, which is significant because district heads are appointed by the government of Kazakhstan.²⁵ This leadership position enables Uyghurs to see one of their own managing local interests, even if it's on a small scale.

Another determining factor for judging how integrated Uyghurs are in Kazakhstan is their social status. International attention is often focused on the more sensational actions of certain Uyghur groups around the world. This is not to suggest that this attention is incorrect, as there have been incidents stemming from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the capture of Uyghur militants in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, and the July 2009 Riots in Urumqi, China. Calls for independence among expatriate groups of Uyghurs may also feed into and play a part in this attention. In Kazakhstan this also has been an issue, particularly when it comes to local organizations.

The Chinese view Uyghur organizations, outside auspices of the sanctioned Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Prefecture (XUAR), as having separatist ambitions, if not outright involvement or support for terrorism in Xinjiang. This often results in China pressuring Kazakhstan, in conjunction with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) anti-terrorist agreements, to curb or ban the activities of Uyghur organizations and to extradite Uyghur

separatists/terrorists.²⁶ Authorities in Kazakhstan have extradited Uyghurs accused of terrorism to China. Several Uyghurs with suspected ties to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and other extremist groups have been handed over to China over the years.²⁷ This has meant that Uyghur organizations in Kazakhstan have come under scrutiny, particularly those with ambitions for autonomy and who are willing to promote violence to achieve it.²⁸

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Uyghurs in Kazakhstan formed organizations such as the East Turkistan Committee and the Uyghurstan Organization for Freedom. These organizations advocated more rights and autonomy for neighboring Xinjiang. Other Uyghur organizations in Kazakhstan in the 1990s also called for more autonomy for Xinjiang. These calls ranged from violent action (advocated by the United National Revolution Front of East Turkistan), autonomy gained through peaceful means (voiced by The People's Party of Uyghurstan), and a more localized group advocating for rights and cultural recognition of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan (The National Association of Uyghurs).²⁹ This has at times put the government in Kazakhstan on edge, as evidenced by an Almaty shooting in 2000. The shooting left two police from the Internal Ministry of Kazakhstan and four men of supposed Uyghur ethnicity dead. Official details of the incident remain unclear, but unofficial sources claim it related to black market economics and not terrorism.³⁰

There are some in Kazakhstan that continue to be concerned about certain Uyghur organizations, particularly those who have recently called for Uyghur freedom and independence.³¹ This call came from a Uyghur that holds a position in the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). The WUC is an international organization based in Munich, Germany that, according to its website, 'represents the collective interest of the Uyghur people both in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and abroad.'³² Most leadership positions within the organization are filled

by expatriate Uyghurs living in Europe or the U.S., with only two being held by citizens of Kazakhstan. While Uyghurs in Kazakhstan may see the WUC as an advocate group, how does the organization provide tangible results that affect their daily lives? Uyghurs are more likely to see members of their local community as advocates, as an incident from 2006 demonstrates.

The town of Shelek is located in the Enbekshikazakh District, Almaty Province and its population includes a mix of Kazakhs and Uyghurs. On the night of November 18, 2006 a fight broke out between teenagers in a local café. The fight pitted young Kazakhs and Uyghurs against each other and spilled into the street before elders from both sides put a halt to it, as police were not able to initially contain it. News of the fight largely stayed out of the media in Kazakhstan until December 8th, when a newspaper article appeared claiming the incident was a ‘fight of nationalities,’ and that the young Uyghurs had heatedly said that night ‘The government is yours, but the land is ours.’³³ The government of Kazakhstan acknowledged the incident on December 21st, in particular because of the debate the article provoked and to calm the situation down. Posted signs appeared in the Baraholka market in Almaty around this time, saying ‘Death to Uyghurs.’ This was the third interethnic type conflict in Kazakhstan in 2006; other incidents took place in the cities of Aktau and Atyrau involving immigrant workers from the Caucasus and Turkey respectively.

Not long after the first article, a second one on the incident appeared in the news but included a more objective account of what happened, including refuting certain details of that night.³⁴ Additionally, prominent Uyghurs in Kazakhstan wrote a letter to the press titled ‘Kazakhstan – our common home.’ The letter outlined the positive involvement and contribution of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, and their support for Nazarbayev.³⁵ Both the second article and the letter highlighted a key fact about the first article’s author, that he was not a witness to the events

and his sources were questionable. As more information came out from credible sources, many in Kazakhstan saw the incident for what it really was; a group of young men had been drinking and got into a fight.³⁶ It was not a spark that would enflame a supposedly large-scale and long running dispute based on ethnic lines. It is worth noting again that elders in the community were responsible for stepping in to calm the situation down. If Uyghur elders were regarded by their Kazakh counterparts as insignificant members of the community, the result of that night could have ended differently.

Perhaps just as important is how the government in Kazakhstan interacts with the Uyghur community. The Assembly of People of Kazakhstan has highlighted activities of Uyghurs that are supported by the government. These include cultural and economic areas and an often overlooked opportunity, education.³⁷ There are schools in Kazakhstan where the main language of instruction is Uyghur, and there are government printed textbooks in the Uyghur language.³⁸ For Uyghurs to be able to teach their native language to the next generation is incredibly important. It is an example of being and acknowledged and accepted by the state as a significant-enough minority to warrant separate schools. Certainly the curriculum is written and controlled by the Education Ministry of Kazakhstan, so it does not include any inflammatory material that might promote a separate Uyghur state. Knowledge of Kazakh, in addition to Russian, is a requirement in the education system, but it is not an instance of a minority being forced to give up their native language. If Kazakhstan was working to fully integrate its Uyghur population, it would not allow them this opportunity. Overall, this does demonstrate a higher social status among minorities in Kazakhstan. The only other minorities to receive separate schools are Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Russians; the latter group is the likely choice for the other numerous ethnicities residing in Kazakhstan.

While the government closely watches organizations with ties to extremist groups, it works with those who are willing to work within the system. One high profile example where this is evident is the current Prime Minister, Karim Masimov. He is an ethnic Uyghur who rose through the ranks to his current position.³⁹ Masimov has not overtly demonstrated through his career that he favors Uyghurs, as it is likely he came into the position as a result of personal connections.⁴⁰ However, it is possible that his position allows him to quietly advocate for his kin in Kazakhstan. Certainly, someone or some entity within the government allowed the few thousand Uyghurs to gather and demonstrate in Almaty against the treatment of their kin in Xinjiang over the July 2009 Riots.

Assessment: Why the Integration Level is Important

The economic and social status of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan may not always be ideal. They have been economically marginalized by greater Kazakh-Chinese economic interests and Uyghur advocacy groups are under close scrutiny, particularly those with evident or even perceived ties to terrorist groups. The economic and security relationship developing between Kazakhstan and China is such that they will take necessary actions to maintain stability, particularly preventing terrorism and keeping the border open for trade. However, these Uyghurs have found ways to maintain economic and social opportunities, most importantly with the support of the government and local communities of Kazakhstan. By having and maintaining this support they do have a solid enough economic and social status where they can be considered to be an integrated minority. Their integration helps to lessen their chances of being involved in interethnic conflict within Kazakhstan and not get involved with extremist groups, particularly

those fighting for an independent Xinjiang. The more integrated they are in Kazakhstan, the more they would have to lose if they get involved in either scenario.

It is worth mentioning again that while Uyghurs on both sides of the border have some common cultural traits and a shared history, the years of separation created differences that are present and will continue for the next generation. If the level of integration continues along its current path, it is unlikely that Uyghurs will be involved in interethnic violence. The incident in Shelek demonstrated that this is contained. Uyghurs are now on their guard to avoid these scenarios and are ready to correct matters if they were to occur. Most importantly, the government of Kazakhstan has conducted outreach type of actions over the past several years that include supporting Uyghur interests that do not conflict with the overall economic and security situation in the country.

As for the possibility that Uyghurs could be involved in supporting cross-border extremist activities, there are examples where Uyghurs have been involved in or advocated for violence, but how many incidents of terrorism or violence have actually happened in Kazakhstan? The situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, where violence continues, is quite different from that in Kazakhstan. Some Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been involved in various levels of an insurgency for a number of years, which is significantly different than any violence that has taken place in Kazakhstan. Despite the close proximity, with only a border separating Uyghurs in Kazakhstan from those in Xinjiang, there is not the same kind of violence spilling into or originating in Kazakhstan. This group will likely continue to show solidarity with Uyghurs internationally, particularly if the WUC continues to advocate for Uyghur rights in Kazakhstan. However, staging a demonstration is not the same thing as clashing with government forces.

If integration continues along its path, Uyghurs will continue to view Kazakhstan as their own country, especially if a give and take relationship continues with the state. The more they view Kazakhstan as their homeland and their role within it, the less likely they are to advocate or support a breakaway republic. What Central Asia can learn from the Uyghur example in Kazakhstan is that despite some economic and social marginalization, and geographic proximity to a conflict zone, an ethnic minority group was able to move past some of its grievances against the state, and vice-versa. This is not a one-size fits all solution for Central Asia, but if other ethnic minority groups and their respective regional governments are able to do this, it could decrease threats.

Notes

¹ "Uyghurs in Japan Call for Freedom in China," Hong Kong *AFP*, July 4, 2010; "Demonstrators in Ankara Protest Incidents in Xinjiang Region on 1st Anniversary," *Anatolia*, July 5, 2010; Roni Rui, "Uyghurs Worldwide Protest on Anniversary of 2009 Violence," *The Epoch Times*, July 7, 2010.

² "Urumqi 'Peaceful' on First Anniversary of 'Deadly' Riot; Locals Inspected," *Xinhua*, July 5, 2010; "Security Camera Blanket Covers Urumqi Ahead of Riot Anniversary," *Xinhua*, July 2, 2010.

³ Eastweek, "Uyghur people stage protest in Kazakhstan," *Eastweek*, July 29, 2009, <<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2009-07-29/uyghur-people-stage-protest-kazakhstan>>, (accessed July 7, 2010).

⁴ Uyghurs lived in the steppe region for several centuries prior to the formation of their khanate, but this established them as a more powerful group and one that modern Uyghurs have a kinship with. For more extensive history on the Uyghurs in Central Asia see: Rene Grousset. *The Empire of the Steppes, a History of Central Asia*, trans. Naomi Walford. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970; and also: James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr, (New York: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2004), pp. 27-62.

⁵ For two excellent sources on Russian expansion into Siberia and Central Asia, see: W. Bruce Lincoln. *The Conquest of a Continent: Siberia and the Russians*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1994; Peter Hopkirk. *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kodansha America, 1992.

⁶ Millward and Perdue, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, pp. 27-62.

⁷ James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, "Political Histories and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr, (New York: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2004), pp. 63-98.

⁸ For one of the most in depth backgrounds on the recent history of Uyghurs in Kazakhstan see: Sean R. Roberts, "The Uighurs of the Kazakhstan borderlands: Migration and the nation," *Nationalities Papers* 26, no. 3 (1998): pp. 511-530.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, "Cross-border Minorities as Cultural and Economic Mediators between China and Central Asia," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2009): pp. 93-119.

¹¹ Roberts, "The Uighurs of the Kazakhstan borderlands," pp. 511-530.

¹² For an more in depth look at Uyghurs in Kazakhstan from a Uyghur point of view, see the website "Uyghurs of Kazakhstan" (in Russian), <<http://uighur.narod.ru/article1.html>>

¹³ The populations of other minorities in multiethnic Kazakhstan, such as Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans, are shrinking, but the number of Uyghurs has grown steadily over the last 20-30 years. This is demonstrated in the censuses taken in 1979, 1989, 1999, and 2009 where Uyghurs made up 1, 1.1, 1.4, and 1.4 percent of the population respectively and numbered around 223,100 people total: Natsuko Oka, "The 'Triadic Nexus' in Kazakhstan: A Comparative Study of Russians, Uighurs, and Koreans," in Ieda, Osamu et al. eds., *Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship?*, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University (2006): pp. 359-380; Thomas S. Szayna, "Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region." *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Implications for the U.S. Army*, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas Szayna. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation (2003): pp. 145-183; *Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan Po Statistike* [Ministry of Statistic of the Republic of Kazakhstan]. "Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya-Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009." [Results of the Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2009]. <http://www.stat.kz/p_perepis/Pages/n_04_02_10.aspx> (accessed October 6, 2010).

¹⁴ Laruelle and Peyrouse, "Cross-border Minorities as Cultural and Economic Mediators between China and Central Asia," pp. 93-119; For the official website and information of the Uyghur District (in Russian), see <http://uigur-akimat.kz/> (accessed December 14, 2010).

¹⁵ Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's Second Chance*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, pp. 30-36.

¹⁶ Calla Wiemer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr, (New York: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2004), pp. 163-189; Sebastien Peyrouse, "Chinese Presence in Kazakhstan: China's Resolve and Central Asia' Apprehension," *China Perspectives* 3 (2008): pp. 34-49.

¹⁷ Peyrouse, "Chinese Presence in Kazakhstan: China's Resolve and Central Asia' Apprehension," pp. 34-49.

¹⁸ Wiemer, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, pp. 163-189.

¹⁹ Peyrouse, "Chinese Presence in Kazakhstan: China's Resolve and Central Asia' Apprehension," pp. 34-49.

²⁰ Wiemer, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, pp. 163-189.

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- ²¹ Sean R. Roberts, "A "Land of Borderlands": Implications of Xinjiangs Trans-border Interactions," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr, (New York: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, 2004), pp. 216-237.
- ²² Laruelle and Peyrouse, "Cross-border Minorities as Cultural and Economic Mediators between China and Central Asia," pp. 93-119.
- ²³ "Uyghurs of Kazakhstan" website, see <<http://uyghur.narod.ru/ruapps.html>> (accessed July 9, 2010).
- ²⁴ Natsuko Oka, "The 'Triadic Nexus' in Kazakhstan: A Comparative Study of Russians, Uyghurs, and Koreans," in Ieda, Osamu et al. eds., *Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship?*, (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2006), pp. 359-380.
- ²⁵ "Aktivu Uyghurskogo raiona Almatinskoi oblasti predstavlen novyi akim," [A new mayor of the Uyghur District, Almaty Province is presented] *Kazinform*, May 11, 2007, <<http://www.inform.kz/rus/article/177961>> (accessed October 22, 2010).
- ²⁶ Oka, "The 'Triadic Nexus' in Kazakhstan," pp. 359-380.
- ²⁷ Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Central Asia: Uyghurs Hit By Autocratic States' Cooperation With Beijing," *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, April 28, 2006, <<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1068046.html>> (accessed July 7, 2010); Natalia Antelava, "Kazakh Uyghurs feel threat from China," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6284734.stm>> (accessed July 7, 2010).
- ²⁸ Oka, "The 'Triadic Nexus' in Kazakhstan," pp. 359-380.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Dilara Isa, "Türdiev Qai Zhaqtyng Üighyrynyng Qūlaghyn Kóterdi?," [Which Side of the Uyghur Ear Did Turdiyev Raise?] *Zhas Alash*, July 13, 2010, <<http://www.zhasalash.kz/sayasat/2286.html>> (accessed October 25, 2010); Dilara Isa, "Zhok Memleketting Tuy," [No Government's Banner] *Zhas Alash*, September 21, 2010, <<http://www.zhasalash.kz/sayasat/2750.html>> (accessed October 25, 2010).
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- ³³ Erganat Uralbaev, "Uiguri Sheleka: Gosudarstvo Vashe, A Zemlya Nasha," [The Uyghurs of Shelek: the Government is Yours, but the Land is Ours] *Internet Gazeta, Zona KZ*, December 8, 2006, <<http://www.zonakz.net/articles/?artid=16326>> (accessed October 25, 2010).
- ³⁴ Valerii Surganov, "Uiguri Sheleka: Nam Ne Nado Kazakhskoi Zemli!," [The Uyghurs of Shelek: We Don't Need Kazakh Land!] *Internet Gazeta, Zona KZ*, January 31, 2007, <<http://www.zonakz.net/articles/16710>> (accessed October 25, 2010).
- ³⁵ Ferghana.ru, "Kazakhstan, Nash Obshii Dom," [Kazakhstan, Our Common Home] *Ferghana.ru*, December 21, 2006, <<http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=4536>> (accessed October 25, 2010).

³⁶ A. Omarova, D. Arkin, "Komu Vygodna Mezhnatsiol'naya Rozn' v Kazakhstane?," [Who Benefits From Interethnic Strife in Kazakhstan?] *Ferghana.ru*, December 25, 2006, <<http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=4806>> (accessed October 25, 2010).

³⁷ Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, "Stabil'nost' i Soglasie Éta Bolshaya Ezhednevnaya Rabota Kotoruiu Nuzhno Provodit' iz Goda v God iz Pokoleniya v Pokoleniya, Prezident RK N. Nazarbaev," [Stability and Harmony is the Most Important Daily Work, Which Should Be Carried Out From Year to Year and From Generation to Generation, Republic of Kazakhstan President N. Nazarbayev] *Assambleya Naroda Kazakhstana, Ofitsial'nyi Sait*, October 21, 2010. <<http://www.assembly.kz/novosti-predsedatelya/item/1072-стабильность-и-согласие-это-большая-ежедневная-работа-которую-нужно-проводить-из-года-в-год-из-поколения-в-поколение-президент-рк-назарбаев.html>> (accessed October 25, 2010).

³⁸ Gosudarstvennye Obshheobjazatel'nye Standarty Srednego Obshhego Obrazovaniya Respubliki Kazahstan, Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Respubliki Kazahstan, Kazahskaja akademija obrazovaniya im. Y. Altynsarina, Almaty 2002. (The Government Compulsory Standards of Secondary General Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Ministry of Education and Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Kazakh Academy of Education named for Ibrahim Altynsarin, Almaty 2002).

³⁹ "Kazakh Parliament Approves New Prime Minister." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 10, 2007, <<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073907.html>> (accessed July, 9 2010).

⁴⁰ Masimov is a graduate of Beijing State University, speaks Chinese, and has a general interest in Chinese culture. He also maintains close ties to the president's daughter Dinara Nazarbayeva and her husband Timur Kulibayev, see A. Shakur, "Uighur Faktor", *Centrasia*, January 11, 2007, <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1168467780>> (accessed July 9, 2010); Mikhail Rostovskiy, "Nazarbayev Has Changed Clans", *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, January 11, 2007.